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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSIONS
1. Article 74 of the Criminal Code, as interpreted, does not
result in a full accomplishment of the desired end, that is, sup-
port of a family by the husband or wife charged with that re-
sponsibility.
2. An amendment, similar to the one suggested, should lead
to more effective enforcement of Article 74 of the Criminal
Code. This would allow prosecution either at the domicile of the
person owing the duty of support or at the justifiably estab-
lished residence of the person to whom the duty of support is
owed.
3. The restrictions on extradition impair the effectiveness of
such a provision where the husband goes to another state. There
seems to be little that can be done about this in strictly non-
support cases.
4. A liberal interpretation of the desertion provision of
Article 74 would achieve a desirable result in those cases where
the husband's intent could be shown at the time he left. This
would
a. Allow prosecution for desertion at the former family
domicile, and,
b. Allow extradition in the event the defendant left the
state as he would then be a fugitive from justice.
GILLIS W. LONG
IMPROPER REMARKS OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the
general rule that "Counsel may argue to the jury both the law
and the evidence of the case, but must confine themselves to
matters as to which evidence has been received; and counsel
shall refrain from any appeal to prejudice."1  A survey of the
jurisprudence indicates that some improper remarks are held
1. This article, as written, applies to defense counsels as well as pros-
ecuting attorneys. Obviously, in a criminal trial, counsel for the defendant
cannot make such an appeal to prejudice as would cause the verdict to
be set aside on appeal. If the jury or court errs in being swayed by the
prejudicial appeals of defense counsel and the result is an acquittal for the
accused, the matter is settled, for the principle of double jeopardy pre-
vents an appeal by the state. Due process of law demands that the defendant
have a fair trial, and errors in the proceedings of a criminal trial that
prejudice this right of the accused result in the denial of due process. The
converse of this is not true; mistakes in the trial that result in the acquittal
of the defendant are not reversible errors. See State v. Schiro, 143 La. 841,
79 So. 426 (1918).
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"incurable," or reversible error per se. In other instances the
prejudicial effect may be "cured" by instructions to disregard
from the trial judge to the jury. Still a third category of remarks,
seemingly intemperate, have been held to be proper, and non-
prejudicial in effect. This comment will deal with the two most
common types of incurable remarks.
Comment by the District Attorney on the Failure of the De-
fendant to Testify
The rule is well settled in Louisiana that the district attor-
ney cannot comment in such a manner as to direct the attention
of the jury to the fact that the defendant has not taken the wit-
ness stand in his own behalf, and that no instruction or charge
by the trial judge to the jury will erase the prejudicial effect of
such a remark. The language used by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in two cases2 seems to stand for the proposition that an in-
struction by the trial judge cures the prejudice resulting from a
comment by the district attorney on the silence of the defendant.
A careful analysis, however, indicates that in one case 3 the state-
ment by the court was purely gratuitous dictum, while in the
2. State v. Varnado, 126 La. 732, 52 So. 1006 (1910); State v. Broughton,
158 La. 1045, 105 So. 59 (1925).
3. In State v. Broughton, 158 La. 1045, 1050, 105 So. 59, 60 (1925), counsel
for the state urged on the court the argument that the instructions of the
trial judge cured the remark by the district attorney on the failure of the
defendant to testify. The court declared, "It is not important, however, in
this case, whether the prejudice arising from such a comment may be re-
moved by instructions from the court, for the court gave no instructions
at the time the remark was made .. " Later in the opinion is found this
language, "Defendant was entitled, at least, to an instruction that the re-
mark was improper, and that the jury should disregard it, and the instruc-
tion should have been given, when the objection was urged and the request
for instructions made. As this was not done, it follows that the verdict and
the sentence appealed from will have to be set aside." (Italics supplied).
Since no instruction to disregard had actually been given by the trial judge,
the statement of the court, at most, is inferential dictum authority.
4. In State v. Varnado, 126 La. 732, 741, 52 So. 1006, 1009 (1910), the dis-
trict attorney remarked, "'The testimony of Ricks, or R. S. Varnado, or
both, in regard to the killing of Amacker, was to be taken for true, because
nobody has taken the stand to deny it.'" The trial judge evidently thought
that the remark was prejudicial and reversible error, because the judge
proposed to discharge the jury. The defendant objected to this, and the
trial judge charged the jury to the effect that the silence of the defendant
was to create no presumption against him. The supreme court, in holding
that no error had been committed, said, "Counsel for the accused in ob-
jecting to the discharge of the jury must have considered that any prejudi-
cial effect of the remarks . . . had been removed by the instruction of the
court. It is not clear that the remarks were intended as a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify and we think the prompt action of the
court removed any possible prejudicial effect .... (126 La. 732, 742, 52 So.
1006, 1010). In view of the many Louisiana cases holding that the remark
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other 4 the court expressed doubt as to whether the remark was,
in fact, on the silence of the defendant.
In State v. Robinson,5 a case illustrative of the many Lou-
isiana cases in point,6 the district attorney remarked to the jury,
"'Gentlemen of the jury, the accused has confessed he shot John
Hase, the party whom he is charged with having killed, and this
confession has been proven by the old man, Robert Turpin; and
gentlemen of the jury, (pointing finger at the defendant) he has
not denied it. He has the right under the law, and.' " At this point
defense counsel objected to the remark, and the trial judge im-
mediately charged the jury that under the law the defendant
was not required to take the witness stand in his own behalf,
and that his failure to do so could not be construed against him.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the verdict, said, "It is absurd
therefore, to suppose that any judicial declaration will remove
the effect of the language which has found lodgement in the
minds of the jurors, spent its force, and subserved its purposes
of creating prejudice against the accused."'7
Another important decision was rendered in State v. Sini-
gal.8 In that case, the district attorney said, "'That young boy did
not take the stand as a witness, . . .and the old woman did not
take the stand as a witness, and nobody else was purported to
know anything about the facts of the case testified that any
other persons than these persons named were present at that
scene that morning. . . .'" When the defense counsel objected, the
district attorney explained, "'I ... have simply counted over to
the jury the number of witnesses who testified to a certain state
of facts.'" The court,9 in holding that this remark constituted
must refer to the failure of the defendant himself to testify before it is
considered by the court as reversible error, this case could not be authority
for any proposition that such remark is cured by instruction from the trial
judge. As It was said in State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 1145, 24 So.
611, 614 (1898), "The failure of the defendant to go up on the stand to
testify (not his failure to place other parties on the stand, or his failure
to introduce evidence to establish a certain fact) was the subject of direct
comment .... We are in accord with the Supreme Court of Mississippi when
it says that the wrong once done cannot be undone by mere admissions
of the district attorney or attempted correction by the court."
5. 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904).
6. State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898); State v Sinigal,
138 La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1915); State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823, 144 So. 587
(1932).
7. State v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 942, 36 So. 811, 812 (1904). See also
State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 1146, 24 So. 611, 615 (1898), where the
court said, " . . .the wrong once done cannot be undone by mere admissions
of the district attorney or attempted correction by the court."
8. 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1915).
9. 138 La. 469, 477, 70 So. 478, 481 (1915).
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reversible error despite the charge of the trial judge to the jury
to ignore the remark of the district attorney, said, "The naming,
by the district attorney to the jury, of the defendants who had
not taken the witness stand might well have been construed by
the jury against those defendants. And the prosecuting officer
should not have made such comment ....
The Louisiana rule that this type of comment constitutes in-
curable error has been limited to cases in which the remark
directly focused the attention of the jury on the fact that the
defendant himself" had not taken the stand as a witness in his
own behalf. For example, a statement of the district attorney
is proper if it merely points up the failure of the defense to call
the wife 12 or mother 13 of the defendant as a witness, or only
directs attention to the weakness of the defense generally.' 4
The language in numerous Louisiana cases1 5 indicates that
the intention of the district attorney at the time he made the re-
mark is controlling as to whether the remark was on the failure
of the defendant to testify or not. In this regard, it is submitted
that the proper test is the one adopted by the court in Reddick
v. State,16 that the intention of the counsel is immaterial if in
fact he used such language as could be reasonably construed
to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Actual-
ly, it is the prejudicial effect on the jury and not the prosecutor's
ulterior motive which renders the comment reversible error.
The case of State v. Robertson 7 is interesting for its amusing
aspects. In that case the district attorney was visualizing to
the jury the scene of the crime, at which time the widow of the
deceased had confronted the defendant, and said to him, "'It
must have been an accident.'" The district attorney, continuing,
10. 138 La. 469, 478, 70 So. 478, 481 (1915).
11. State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898).
12. State v. Brown, 118 La. 373, 42 So. 969 (1907); State v. Todd, 173 La.
23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
13. State v. Simmons, 167 La. 963, 120 So. 612 (1929).
14. State v. Lewis, 156 La. 985, 101 So. 386 (1924). In this case the dis-
trict attorney remarked, "There is no evidence except on one side." The
court, in holding there was no error, said, "An accused may. through differ-
ent sources, other than by taking the stand himself, establish a defense or
offer extenuating circumstances in mitigation of the crime charged. The
language used by the district attorney amounted to nothing more than an
expression of opinion as to the weight of the evidence .... "
15. For example, see State v. Varnado, 126 La. 732, 742, 52 So. 1006, 1010
(1910), where the court said, in holding that no error was committed, "It is
not clear that the remarks were intended as a comment on the failure of
* the accused to testify .... (Italics supplied.)
16. 72 Miss. 1008, 16 So. 490 (1895).
17. 133 La. 806, 63 So. 363 (1913).
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said, "'Was there any answer? No answer then, and no answer
to you, gentlemen of the jury, even yet.'" Here the defense
counsel interrupted the district attorney with an objection, and
the district attorney concluded, "' . . . from a single witness
sworn in this case.' " The court18 held that the remark was not
prejudicial because the inference was not plain that it was a
comment on the failure of the defendant himself to testify.
While it is generally held, as in Louisiana, that it is improper
and highly prejudicial for the prosecuting attorney to comment
upon the failure of the accused to take the stand,19 the Louisiana
view that such comments are incurable reversible error has not
been followed. "The weight of authority seems to be that com-
ments of the prosecuting attorney on the failure of the defendant
to testify in a criminal case, though highly improper, may under
some circumstances work no injury, where the 'trial judge
promptly intervenes, excluding the comments and admonishing
the jury to disregard them. In other words, comments of that
kind stand on very much the same footing as other improper
arguments and whether they call for reversal or not depends on
whether, after a full consideration of all the circumstances, in-
cluding the action of the trial judge at the time they were made,
the appellate court is of the opinion no prejudice resulted. '20
Pertinent to the Louisiana jurisprudence is the provision of
Act 157 of 191621 that states, "In the trial of all indictments, com-
plaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the
commission of crimes or offenses, a person so charged shall, at
his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent wit-
ness; and his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any
presumption against him." (Italics supplied.) Insofar as this sec-
tion of the statute applies to criminal cases, it has been super-
seded by Article 461 of the Criminal Code of Procedure of 1928.22
18. 133 La. 806, 821, 63 So. 363, 369 (1913).
19. Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 785, "Under statutes expressly prohibiting
comment on the failure of the accused to testify, and under those provid-
ing that his failure to become a witness in his own behalf shall create no
presumption against him, and under other statutes of similar import, it is
generally held that it is improper and prejudicial for the prosecuting attor-
ney, in the course of the trial, to comment on or make any reference to the
fact that the accused did not testify as a witness in his own behalf."
20. Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 795.
21. La. R. S. (1950) § 13:3665.
22. "The competent witness in any criminal proceeding, in court, or be-
fore a person having authority to receive evidence, shall be a person of
proper understanding, but; .... Third. In the trial of all indictments, com-
plaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission
of crimes or offenses, a person so charged shall, at his own request, but
not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness."
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Article 461 is substantially the same as the above quoted statute,
but the words, "and his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create
any presumption against him" are not present in the codal pro-
vision. The absence of this language has provided a basis for the
contention that the law has changed2 3 so as to allow the prosecut-
ing attorney to comment on the failure of the accused to take the
stand in his own behalf. However, a summary examination of
the cases 24 decided both before and after the adoption of the
Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that no change has been
brought about by this omission in Article 461. Indeed there is
considerable authority for the view that a constitutional amend-
ment would be necessary to effect a change in the law on this
subject.25
The prohibition of comment on the silence of the accused
has been the subject of much criticism, 26 and a review of its con-
stitutional aspects may be enlightening. The case of Adamson v.
People of Calio rnia27 held that nothing in the Federal Constitu-
tion forbids counsel for the state from commenting on the failure
of the accused to take the witness stand in his own behalf. Re-
lying on a state constitutional provision,28 as well as statutory
authority,29 the prosecuting attorney commented on the fact that
the accused had not taken the witness stand in his own defense.
The defendant was an ex-convict and refused to testify because
of fear that his past record would be disclosed to the jury on
cross-examination. It is well settled that once the defendant takes
23. Note (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 423. See also State v. Davis, 214
La. 831, 845, 39 So.(2d) 76, 80 (1949), wherein is found the language, "The
state urges also that there is no law in this state either in the Constitution
or in the statutes which sanctions the rule that the district attorney and
that judge must not discuss or comment on the defendant's failure to tes-
tify. In support of this contention the State has presented to the court a
most interesting and lucid discussion of the historical basis for the rule in
England and its evolution in this country, and a logical argument for the
contention that the rule does not exist in this state. However, inasmuch as
we consider that the statement of the assistant district attorney was not a
comment on the failure of the accused to testify, we do not decide the case
on the basis of this contention."
24. State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898); State v. Sini-"
gal, 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1915); State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823, 144 So.
587 (1932); State v. Broughton, 158 La. 1045, 105 So. 59 (1925); State v. Glau-
son, 165 La. 270, 115 So. 484 (1928); State v. Antoine, 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465
(1938); State v. Goldstein, 187 La. 353, 174 So. 873 (1937).
25. Note (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 423, Comment (1932) 31 Mich.
L. Rev. 40.
26. See Wigmore on Evidence (3 ed. 1940) 425, § 2272a, for arguments
pro and con.
27. 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
28. Calif. Const., Art. 1, § 13.
29. Calif. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) § 1323.
1950]
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the witness stand, he is subject to the same rules as any other
witness, 30 and evidence of past crimes may be used to impeach
his testimony as a witness. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, defendant contended that his rights under the
Fifth Amendment 31 of the Federal Constitution were violated in
that the comment of the district attorney indirectly coerced him
to take the stand in his own defense. The Supreme Court held
that ,the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution was not
applicable to the states by virtue of either the due process clause
or the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This opinion makes it clear that the prohibition
against comment on the silence of the accused is grounded on
statutory and constitutional provisions of the states.
In State v. Ferguson,32 it was held that if the privilege of the
defendant to refrain from testifying in his own behalf were
merely statutory, as distinguished from constitutional, the dis-
trict attorney could remark on the silence of the accused. In
State v. Wolf,3 3 it was held that an amended state statute34 which
permitted the prosecuting attorney to comment on the silence
of the defendant was unconstitutional, being in violation of the
Constitution of South Dakota. 35 During the course of its opinion,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota said, "It is quite clear that
this court is committed to the rule that it is a violation of con-
situtional rights to permit comment on the failure of the accused
to testify. If such is the law, it is equally clear that such consti-
30. State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919); State v. McCollough,
149 La. 1061, 90 So. 404 (1922); State v. Vastine, 172 La. 137, 133 So. 389 (1931).31. U. S. Const. Amend. V says that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." See also La. Const. of
1921, Art. I, § 11.
32. 226 Iowa 361, 283 N. W. 917 (1939).
33. 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W. 116, 104 A. L. R. 464 (1936).
34. S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4879 (before amendment) was as follows:
"In the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and other pro-
ceedings against persons charged with the commission of any crime ...
the person charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a com-
petent witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any
presumption against him." Note the similarity between this South Dakota
statute and La. Act 157 of 1916. The South Dakota statute was amended
by Chapter 93 of the 1927 Session Laws of South Dakota; the pertinent
changes are as follows: ". . . the person charged shall, at his own request,
but not otherwise, be a competent witness, and his failure to testify in his
own behalf, is hereby declared to be a proper subject of comment by the
prosecuting attorney in his closing argument, without any previous reference
thereto having been made in argument either on behalf of the state or the
defendant, the attorney for the defendant may thereafter, if he so request
the court, argue upon such comment for such time as the court shall fix."
Amended in S. D. Code (1939) § 34.3633.
35. S. D. Const., Art. VI, § 9, says, "No person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to give evidence against himself."
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tutional rights cannot be abrogated, abridged, or curtailed by the
mere passage of a statute by the legislative branch of the state
government. . . . It may be that the right to comment upon the
failure of the accused to exercise his right to become- witness in
his own behalf should be conferred upon the prosecutors as the
matter of public policy; but if prosecutors are to have such right,
it must be conferred upon them by constitutional amendment.
... Until the Constitutions are changed, it cannot and must not
be made by legislative enactment or judicial interpretation. '3 6
(Italics supplied.) In view of the above authorities, it is submitted
that statute law of Louisiana could not be changed so as to allow
comment on the failure of the defendant to testify without a con-
stitutional amendment. It is significant that the Louisiana legisla-
ture, by a large majority, voted to exclude from the Code of
Criminal Procedure a provision that would enable the prosecuting
attorney to comment on the failure of the defendant to take the
witness stand in his own behalf.31
Appeals to Racial Prejudice
Appeal to racial prejudice by the district attorney is another
error which cannot be cured by an instruction of the trial judge.
In the case of State v. Moore,38 a very good illustration of this
rule, the district attorney said to the negro defendant, "Then
you struck him because he was a white man." The Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the remark was reversible error, and
declared, "In our opinion, the remark of the district attorney,
framed as a question, was an appeal to race prejudice, was high-
ly prejudicial to the rights of the accused, and entitled them to
a new trial ... We recognize the general rule to be that a verdict
should not be set aside on account of improper remarks by the
prosecuting attorney when the jury is instructed to disregard
such remarks. However, even conceding that the instructions
in this case were given at the time the statement was made, we
think that the appeal to race prejudice constituted such an error
36. See opinion by Justice Cardozo in Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244,
256, 177 N. E. 489, 491, 87 A. L. R. 418 (1931), where the court said, in ref-
erence to the self incrimination clause of the New York Constitution, "The
privilege may not be violated because in a particular case its restraints
are inconvenient or because the supposed malefactor may be a subject of
public execration or because the disclosure of his wrongdoing will promote
the public weal. It is a barrier . . . interposed by the sovereign people of
the state; and neither legislators nor judges are free to overleap it."
37. Louisiana Senate Journal (June 13, 1928) 295, 297, 310; Louisiana
House Journal (June 19, 1928) 544, 545.
38. 212 La. 943, 945, 33 So. (2d) 691, 692 (1947).
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as could not be cured by the judge's instructions to disregard. 3 9
It is significant that the general jurisprudence is more liberal
than that of Louisiana in regard to the effect of improper appeal
to racial prejudice, holding that such comment is reversible error
unless its effect is counteracted by a proper instruction to disre-
gard.40 Possibly the Louisiana Supreme Court, in adopting the
more stringent rule that appeal to racial prejudice is reversible
error per se, has taken judicial notice of the tense situation ex-
isting between whites and negroes in the South. In State v.
Bessa,41 the supreme court said, "Why did the district attorney
bring up the matter of blood if it did not draw the color line?...
The court thinks it knows enough about the situation between
the whites and negroes in Louisiana to know that the average
white man is prone to be prejudiced in such a case without be-
ing exhorted thereto by a law officer of the government, and
that, such an appeal having been once made, the effects thereof
cannot be counteracted by any mere cautionary words of sober
reason that may be uttered by the judge."
Two cases appear to distinguish between the situation in
which the negro defendant is charged with a crime inflicted on
another negro, and the situation in which the victim is a white
person. In one of these cases, State v. Thomas,4 2 the negro de-
fendant was charged with the murder of another negro. The
district attorney said, "Look at the crowd. . . attending this
trial. They did not come here for idle curiosity. A verdict of
guilty as charged would meet with their sentiments, and deter
negroes from the commission of other crimes." In this case there
was an immediate charge by the trial judge telling the jury to
ignore the remarks of the district attorney. The supreme court
held that there was no error, and in the course of the opinion
said, "Under the circumstances of this particular case, we are
of the opinion that the effect of any prejudice which may have
arisen from the remarks made was removed entirely from the
39. 212 La. 943, 947, 33 So. (2d) 691, 692 (1947). See also State v. Bessa,
115 La. 259, 264, 38 So. 985, 987 (1905), where the court said, regarding an
appeal to racial prejudice, ". . . such an appeal having been once made,
the effects thereof cannot be counteracted by any mere cautionary words
of sober reason that may be uttered by the judge."
40. Note (1932)'78 A. L. R. 1440, "It is a general rule, applicable in civil
and in criminal cases alike, that an improper appeal by counsel to racial,
religious, social or political prejudices, resulting injuriously to the adverse
party, is ground for granting a new trial or reversing a judgment where
the effect of the improper appeal was not sufficiently counteracted by action
in the trial court. , .."
41. 115 La. 259, 264, 38 So. 985, 987 (1905).
42. 161 La. 1010, 1014, 109 So. 819, 821 (1926).
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minds of the jury, by the instruction of the court .... The case,
however, in our opinion, would have been different had the de-
fendant been charged with the murder of a white man, as a dis-
tinct and unjustifiable appeal to race prejudice would have been
the result, and the presumption of injury to the accused would
have been so strong that it could not be cured by the action of
the court in instructing the jury to disregard the remarks of the
state's attorney. . . . "4 (Italics supplied.)
The possibility of such a distinction, dependent only upon
whether the victim was white or colored, was definitely rejected,
however, in the more recent case of State v. Bedford.44 The de-
fendant was a young negro girl charged with the murder of a
negro man, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, in holding that
certain of the remarks constituted an appeal to racial prejudice,
succinctly concluded, "This is so even though defendant is a n e-
gro girl who was convicted of having killed a negro man by a
jury composed of white men. ' 45 (Italics supplied.)
It is indicated in at least two cases that appeal to anti-negro
prejudice is more serious than attempts to invoke prejudice
against other races or nationalities. In State v. Rodasta,46 the dis-
43. 161 La. 1010, 1015, 109 So. 819, 821 (1926). See also State v. Satcher,
124 La. 1015, 1023, 50.So. 835, 838 (1909), where the negro defendant was
charged with killing another negro. The district attorney remarked, "I want
to say to you that it seems to me that human life is wonderfully cheap
in Jackson Parish, especially if that human life is a negro life . . . If a
negro kills a negro, he usually graduates by killing a white man." This
remark was followed by an immediate charge from the trial judge, and
on appeal, the supreme court, holding that no error had been committed,
said, "the court having instructed the jury ... we find no sufficient reason
for assuming that its instructions were not heeded." 124 La. 1015, 1024, 50
So. 835, 838 (1909).
44. 193 La. 104, 113, 190 So. 347, 350 (1939).
45. 193 La. 104, 108, 190 So. 347, 348 (1938), where the district attorney
said, of the negro girl defendant who was under 17 years of age, "there
is no provision (for punishment) for the colored girl, so far as I know.
Anything less than a capital crime will fall under the supervision of a
Juvenile Court, and a Juvenile Court may do nothing with a person of
color, a girl under seventeen years of age, other than to turn her over to
some responsible person who will care for her and look after her .. " The
supreme court, in holding that reversible error had been committed, said,
"We do not think the instructions of the trial judge were such as to efface
from the minds of the jurors the impression made by the prejudicial state-
ments of the district attorney. . . . In these circumstances, the trial judge
could not and he did not make any serious effort to disabuse the minds of
the jurors of the harmful effect of the statement .... In the first place, the
statement emphasized the fact that the defendant was of the negro race,
which was in itself an appeal to race prejudice .... It does not require any
considerable argument to support the proposition that the statement of the
district attorney must have been extremely harmful to the cause of the
defendant." 193 La. 104, 113, 190 So. 347, 350 (1938).
46. 173 La. 623, 637, 138 So. 124, 128 (1931). Cf. State v. Lee, 116 La. 607,
615, 40 So. 914, 917 (1906). In this case, the district attorney, in urging the jury
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trict attorney, in explaining his theory of the case to the jury,
said, "... Remember this gentlemen, and I'm not saying this to be
snobbish; I am not saying this as a reflection on him, but the
man's position in society, his breeding, his family were not the
equal of her family, they are not of the same race. She married
beneath herself." The defendant was of Italian extraction. The
court held that the remark was not an appeal to racial prejudice.
In comparison with these two cases, consider the case of State v.
Moore,47 where the defendant was a negro, and the court held
the remark, "Then you struck him because he was a white man,"
to be reversible error, incurable by instructions from the trial
judge. It is significant that no Louisiana case was found in which
the court held a remark to be reversible appeal to racial pre-
judice, except where the defendant was a negro. A probable
rationale of these cases is that the court, having taken judicial
cognizance of the position of the negro in the South, feels that
there is a greater danger that prejudice will result from an ap-
peal to racial difference if the defendant, is a negro than if the
defendant is merely of another nationality. The generality of this
distinction is weakened by decisions in other Southern states
holding appeals to prejudice against others than negroes, that is,
Italians 48 and Jews, 49 to be reversible error.
Even limiting the problem to the admittedly serious con.-
ment upon the fact that the accused is a negro, it is impossible
to lay down a categorical test whereby one can tell when a par-
ticular remark is sufficiently pointed to constitute an appeal to
racial prejudice.50 The somewhat nebulous line of distinction can
to believe the witnesses for the state, said, "You must believe the testimony
of these two white boys, two American citizens ....... The court held that
the district attorney had properly used this language to distinguish between
the witnesses for the state, and the negro and Italian witnesses for the
defendant.
47. 212 La. 943, 945, 33 So. (2d) 691, 692 (1947).
48. Logi v State, 168 Ark. 793, 271 S.W. 451, 78 A.L.R. 1446 (1925), where
the court held remarks of the district attorney concerning Italian immi-
grant to be reversible error. See further State v. Risso, 131 La. 946, 60 So.
625 (1913).
49. Golden v. State, 23 Okla. Crim. Rep. 243, 214 Pac. 946, 78 A.L.R.
1442 (1923), where the court held remarks of the district attorney to be
reversible error when he went outside the record and misquoted scriptures
in a manner calculated to inflame and prejudice the minds of the jurors
against the accused because he was a Jew.
50. Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 1440, "The distinction between references to
race, religion, social status, or political affiliation which do not, because
of their nature and the attendant circumstances, constitute an appeal to
prejudice, and such references which, though conceded to be appeals to
prejudice, are nevertheless held to cause no injury, is rather nebulous.
However, courts treat such alleged appeals to prejudice from both stand-
points .. "
COMMENTS
best be approximated by comparing some of the remarks that
have been held non-prejudicial and some of those which have
been held prejudicial in the absence of instructions by the judge.
The following remarks have been treated as not constituting
appeals to racial prejudice:
(1) The deceased "was shot in the head, and this negro
(pointing and referring to the defendant) evidently ran, after
he killed the deceased."'
(2) "If the jury do not convict in this case how is any
white man's property to be free from the torch of a dissatisfied
negro tenant? '52
(3) "I am sure that this jury will not be influenced by the
testimony of this congregation of negro witnesses that Ben How-
ard, a big Mason and church member, has been able to procure
the innocence of his son . . .,,.
(4) "During the reconstruction days when we had negro
domination in this state, the Ku Klux Klan were organized and
the best people of the state shouldered their guns for the protec-
tion of our white people .... Now we have no more negro dom-
ination, but a government by the white people, and hence no
necessity for lynching. Every man . .. is entitled to and will have
a fair and impartial trial, no matter what the charge might be,
and the fact that this negro is given a fair trial is no reason why
you should believe him innocent. '5 4
(5) "Gentlemen, . . . If you find the accused not guilty,
you will clear the negroes, but you will convict Mr. Henderson
(the only witness for the state) of dirty, stinking, slimy per-
jury ....
(6) The district attorney, in questioning a prospective juror
on his voir dire, asked him if his friendship for the deceased was
the friendship "of a white man for a white man or a white man
for a negro."50
The following remarks were held to constitute an appeal to
racial prejudice, and to constitute reversible error. The full im-
port of these decisions is weakened by the fact that in none of the
cases were there instructions by the trial judge to ignore the
51. State v. Barnhart, 143 La. 596, 600, 78 So. 975, 977 (1918).
52. State v. Glauson, 165 La. 270, 281, 115 So. 484, 488 (1928).
53. State v. Howard, 120 La. 311, 316, 45 So. 260, 261 (1907).
54. State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 1016, 44 So. 848, 849 (1907).
55. State v. Johnson, 48 La. Ann. 87, 19 So. 213 (1896).
56. State v. Brady, 50 So. 806, 807, 124 La. 951, 953 (1909).
19501
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
remarks. However, the remarks were apparently considered as
reversible error per se:
(1) "I did lose control of myself; every drop of my white
man's blood did boil in me and the white man's blood of other
men in this court rose up in righteous indignation, when this
negro woman on trial, in a crowded court-room in the parish of
Grant, and in the town of Colfax, with its past history, used
slanderous... language against the officers of Grant parish and
against white men."5 7
(2) "Gentlemen of the jury, it is high time to put a stop
to these murders by negro women, by hanging some of them
.... The only way to put a stop to it is to bring a verdict of
guilty as charged and have a hanging."5 8
(3) "Notwithstanding the fact that the prosecuting witness
was a prostitute, she was a white woman and belonged to the
same race to which their mothers belonged.
9
(4) "The defendant should not be tried by the same law
as a white man. . . .You can't try a negro by negro evidence
the same as you can try a white man by white evidence."60
While it is not possible to draw a clear line between per-
missible and prejudicial racial comments, one fact stands out in
bold relief-the prosecution should be extremely cautious to
avoid the possibility of clouding the issue of guilt or innocence
by allusions to the defendant's race.
LAWRENCE E. DONOHOE
THEFT-THE EFFECT OF INFLATION UPON THE
VALUE-PENALTY RATIO
The difficulty of making the punishment fit the crime has
long been a serious problem. This question has weighed heavily
on the minds of laymen and lawyers alike. Public consciousness
of the problem is clearly demonstrated by the laws and litera-
ture that have come down through the centuries.
Retribution was stressed by the Code of Hammurabi, 2250
B.C., which provided that, "If a man destroy the eye of another
man, they shall destroy his eye."' Cicero evidenced a more hu-
57. State v. Jones, 127 La. 694, 697, 53 So. 959, 960 (1911).
58. State v. Brown, 148 La. 357, 358, 86 So. 912, 913 (1921).
59. State v. Perry, 124 La. 931, 942, 50 So. 799, 803 (1909).
60. State v. Brice, 163 La. 392, 393, 111 So. 798 (1927).
1. Cook, The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi (London, 1903)
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